Abstract: How can laypeople justiably distinguish between reliable experts and unreliable experts? This problem, usually called the`problem of expert identication', is highly debated in recent social epistemology. A great amount of work has been undertaken in order to nd satisfactory criteria for identifying experts in dierent branches of the empirical sciences, but hardly in the domain of moral knowledge. This asymmetry between social and moral epistemology is the motivation behind my paper. I reconsider the epistemological problem of identifying moral experts by applying identication criteria developed in general social epistemology to the area of morality. As I will show, all of these criteria turn out to be inappropriate for identifying moral experts. This result seems implausible, because it conicts with the observation that moral experts play an important role in public and scientic discourse, in ethics committees and boards. But this is not a real contradictionas I will illustrate by explaining which tasks these experts can, in my view, full.
Introduction
The German novelist and essayist Ingo Schulze wrote an essay about the nancial crisis in the European Union. He reported two observations he made in panel discussions on this controversial topic with eminent economical, political and moral implications: rst, the impact or authority of statements in the course of these discussions hinges essentially on the (economical) expertise ascribed to the speaker by the audience. Second, every time a personoften Schulze himself, in this caseexpresses a statement which is not in line with the established opinions (which are usually shaped by the economical experts), these statements are primarily not taken as a dissenting opinion on the matter, but as an information about the person who made the statement. This`switching' eect (as I will call it) has the consequence that the dissenting statement is not interpreted as a contribution to the topic in question that is worth considering, but as an expression of the worldview (naïve, socialist or a mixture of both?) of the speaker (Schulze 2012 (Schulze , 1113 .
Is this observation of any philosophical relevance? I think it is. It draws our attention to some important aspects of knowledge acquisition in social contexts, which is the subject of social epistemology. The rst aspect is an epistemological truism: the epistemic authority of a statement expressed by a speaker is inter alia determined by the status of expertise ascribed to her or him in a certain social context. For this reason the concepts of expertise and expert are highly debated in recent social epistemology and traditionally the concept of epistemic authority was a starting point for several denitions of the notion of an expert (Scholz 2009, 189191) . The second aspect is a more delicate one and deserves further philosophical clarication: verbal statements of individual speakers not only inform us about facts, but can also contain information about the speaker herself. This phenomenon even occurs in everyday situations. A simple example: imagine me and four other people looking at a red house. We all agree: The house is red! A sixth person joins us and states: The house is grey! Obviously, we do not learn anything new about the house's colour, but we are informed about the colour-blindness of the sixth person.
I quote Schulze's observation of the`switching' eect, because it gives rise to a fundamental epistemological question: when am I justied to take a statement as a reliable testimony and when should I attribute the statement to failures or shortcomings of the speaker? This question may be easily answered in everyday contexts like in my example, but it becomes more complicated in situations where our own knowledge is so limited that we have to rely on expertise. Currently, we need expertise in many areas to solve the pressing problems of our time. If we want to evaluate the consequences of the European nancial crisis we need economic expertise on the one hand, but also political expertise in order to be informed about the enforcability of governmental interventions, and also moral expertise in order to consider what is permissible to do and to which actions we might be morally obliged while our economy and currency system is in danger.
The epistemological key question is: how can we decide which experts to trust and which to distrust? In recent literature in social epistemology this problem is discussed under the title the problem of expert identiability (Goldman 1991, 129) . In general, the theoretical task of solving this problem consists in the development of a catalogue of criteria to dierentiate between experts and laypeople in a certain domain. Up to now a great amount of work has been undertaken in order to nd satisfactory criteria for identifying experts in dierent areas of the empirical sciences (Goldman 1999; Scholz 2009 ). By contrast, there is comparatively little work done to solve the problem of expert identiability for the domain of moral knowledge. In the recent literature on the topic moral experts the identication problem is often evaluated as not a particularly deep or in principle an insurmountable problem (Hills 2009, 96) . The current discussion in moral philosophy locates the main problem not in the epistemic unavailability of moral knowledge by testimony, but in its unusability (Hopkins 2007, 626.) .
This tendency leads to a shift away from epistemological questions and to a focus on the moral problem of recognizing the authority of experts in moral questions while remaining an autonomously acting person, claiming one's right of democratic self-government in modern societies (Archard 2011, 125127) .
My main project in this paper is to reconsider the epistemological problem of identifying moral experts. I apply the most important identication criteria developed in general social epistemology to the area of morality. As I will show, all of these criteria turn out to be inappropriate for identifying moral experts.
Hence my considerations undermine the credibility of alleged moral experts in general. There are no good epistemic reasons to believe in their moral advice.
At rst glance, this result might seem absurd. The appeal to moral expertise is highly established in philosophical ethics and public discourse. It is deeply entrenched in medical and research ethics (clinical ethics committees, institutional review boards), risk assessment in environmental ethics (see e.g. the ethics committee for a safe energy supply, Ethikkommission für eine sichere Energieversorgung, installed by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel on 22 March 2011) and many other areas, especially in applied ethics. So my second task is to explain why this social practice is not necessarily a contradiction to my arguments.
In the following section I will introduce a set of acknowledged criteria developed for the identication of experts in general social epistemology (section 2 ).
Then I will apply these criteria to the area of moral expertise and will show that the arguments for the credibility of moral experts do not succeed to justify the trust in moral experts (section 3 to 5 ). I will conclude by explaining which role moral experts in ethics committees and boards may nevertheless fulll (section 6 ).
What Is an Expert and How to Identify Her?
Criteria for Expert Identication
In social epistemology the concept of expertise is usually characterized as a special case of testimony: there are many instances of knowledge by testimony which are not instances of knowledge on the basis of expertise, but every instance of knowledge by expertise is an instance of knowledge by testimony. For this reason, an expert is an epistemic witness who fulls some further conditions. In what follows, I apply, to a great extent, Goldman's denition of and identication criteria for experts (Goldman 1999, 276271; , improved by Scholz (2009 Before I apply the four criteria (B) to (E) to the domain of morality in order to use them to develop a precise conception of how to identify moral experts, one further comment is necessary.
At rst sight, talking about`truth' and`justication' seems problematic in the domain of morality, because only metaethical conceptions with a realist metaphysics and a cognitivist epistemology are entitled to apply these terms to the area of ethics, i.e. in the sense of a conception of objective (realist) truth and epistemic justication. For my present purpose I do not have to interpret these concepts in this strict way. Instead I aim at integrating any metaethical accounts except radical subjecitivism, i.e., all accounts that strive to capture the cognitivist intuitions that the central tenets of morality are the subject of rational moral discourse about the right and the wrong, and that reasons can be given for intersubjective agreement and disagreement. If one abandoned these conditions it would be dicult to explain why expertise could ever play a role in the area of morality. As a matter of fact most metaethical positions accept these modest cognitivist intuitions. There are some approaches trying to reconcile cognitivism with an anti-realist metaphysics (Skorupski 1999; Wright 1996) . And even modern non-cognitivistse.g. Simon Blackburn (1984; 1993; 2006) and Allan Gibbard (1990; 2003) have developed an expressivist semantics for moral statements to earn the right to talk of moral truth (Blackburn 1984, 197) .
In this wider sense the talk of truth and justication is in line with most modern metaethical accounts. Against this background it seems quite reasonable to apply Goldman's ve criteria to the area of morality in order to investigate whether there is any suitable criterion to identify moral experts at all.
Independent Checks of Moral ExpertiseCriterion (E)
I begin my discussion with Criterion (E). Goldman (2001, 106) himself stresses that, because of its justicatory independence and exoteric accessibility, this criterion is the layperson's best source of evidence for making credibility choices.
Furthermore, in the domain of empirical knowledge it has a great number of applications. The credibility of economists can be checked by the reliability of their anticipation of market trends and performance of shares, the meteorologist can be evaluated on the basis of her weather forecasts, the car mechanic by his ability to repair a car and keep it functioning and the shoemaker by his skill to make good shoes.
The problem with Criterion (E) is that, in the domain of morality, there is no epistemic resource available to conduct one of these independent checks. There are no predictions or forecasts that can be compared with actual events (McGrath 2008, 97) . And there is no form of specic`moral functioning' that could be evaluated independently of the expert knowledge of morality via exoterically accessible track records (Archard 2011, 122) . On the contrary, it is possible that an economic system works very eciently only because of moral deciencies and that the appeal to moral norms compromises its functional qualities and eectiveness.
Many contributors to the debate have reacted to this challenge by suggesting that we do not appeal to experts of morality tout court, but to experts in limited or specialized domains of moral thinking (Hopkins 2007, 623626; Jones 1999, 6466) . The leading intuition behind this suggestion seems to be that the domain of morality is far more diverse, particularized and structurally complex and that this feature of morality has to be accounted for in our theory of moral experts. Referring to`moral expertise' tout court is oversimplied and fails to provide a realistic account of the role expertise actually plays in our moral discourse. In our actual practice we acknowledge moral expertise in specic areas of environmental, medical, research ethics etc., instead of expertise for morality in general. Perhaps independent checks are possible in at least some of these specied domains.
I think that it is right that we need a conceptual clarication to incorporate the phenomenon of heterogeneity in our theory of moral expertise. But as we will see, this clarication will not allow us to identify moral experts on the basis of Criterion (E).
Let me explain the relevant point in more detail. How can the particularization and structural heterogeneity of morality be explained? I think it is due realism turns out to be successfulalthough some doubts are justied, as I have shown elsewhere (Homann 2008, 188196, 209231) . Among ethics experts this is a highly controversial question. Richard Hare thinks that moral judgments are only`unbiased', if they are made from an`impersonal standpoint'. This standpoint is characterized by him as impartial, which means that it is preserved by any system of moral reasoning which insists on the universalizability of moral judgments (Hare 1981, 211) . Other ethicists conrm the relevance of impartiality, but deny the close connection to universalizability (Nielsen 1985) . There are also moral theories that do not contain the impartiality claim at all. The best known moral theory of this type is the theory of rational egoism, prominently discussed by Henry Sidgwick (1907, Book II) as one of the three main methods of ethics. I think that this deep disagreement among ethics experts indicates that it takes genuine moral knowledge to settle the question. For this reason, one has to refer to genuine moral expertise to solve this intricate moral problem, but Criterion (D) already assumes an impartiality claim as a presupposition to identify moral experts. Hence, the resulting justicatory structure seems to be viciously circular.
An obvious rejoinder to this problem is to refer to the distinction between exoteric and esoteric knowledge. We are no tabula rasa concerning morality, but we all have exoteric knowledge about morality, which is available without the I see two arguments that speak against this rejoinder. First, one might suggest that it conceptualizes the scope of exoteric moral knowledge too broadly.
The impartiality requirement and its moral justication are far too specialized and complicated to be part of exoteric moral knowledge. And many people who trust in moral experts are not able to give an area-specic account of their own moral competence. However, perhaps this counter-argument already admits too much. I think that the rejoinder is problematic for a second, more fundamental reason. The distinction between esoteric and exoteric knowledge it presupposes may be sharpened to a satisfactory degree in the empirical domain. But it blurs when applied to the domain of moral knowledge. That is the case, because the esoteric/exoteric-distinction has a historical aspect: as the eclipse-example illustrates, knowledge that was esoteric at a certain time can become exoteric later on. It becomes accessible to everyone by a simple observation. Therefore, the status of empirical knowledge as esoteric or exoteric may change relative to the epistemic sources available to the epistemic subject in question.
But when we look at the domain of morality and wonder where the original epistemic source of moral knowledge lies, which we view as exoteric at present, we usually have to refer to an epistemically trustworthy person, who informed us about the relevant moral rules, judgments and norms. In the early stages of our education these persons were our parents, then our educators or child care
workers, and later on in school they were our teachers and tutors. Of course, not all of these people are experts in the sense explicated above (section 2 ), but Second, it is unclear who is a member of the`relevant expert community' and who is not. This theoretical option, it seems, again leads to a circularity problem analogous to the one described in section 3 : one has to refer to moral truth to determine the relevant expert community, but the relevant expert community's consensus denes moral truth.
So it seems reasonable to adhere to a conception of moral truth that saves the non-empirical epistemology of moral judgments and does not reduce truth to expert consensus. In this case, consensus is interpreted merely as an epistemic indicator for truth. This indicator thesis avoids the two fatal objections against the consensus theory of truth. But it only holds if two other epistemic conditions are fullled. In the following, I will lay out these two conditions with the help of the Bayesian approach.
The Bayesian approach in epistemology is particularly suitable for giving a precise account of some characteristics of rational belief up-dating while obtaining information by a group of epistemic witnesses or experts (Bovens/Hartmann 2003, chap. 3) . I use a simple model designed by McGrew (1999) to bring out the crucial points.
Let's assume that a person has no reason for and no reason against believing a certain moral statement MS. In this situation, it is rational to apply the principle of insucient reason (or: principle of indierence) and to assign the same degree of belief to MS as to non-MS.
Cr (MS) = Cr (¬MS) = 0.5
It is also assumed that there are a number of experts (for the sake of simplicity:
the three experts E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 ) who provide information about the truth of MS. We now want to know how the credibility of MS changes when the experts assent to its truth. This can be calculated with the help of a conditional credibility Cr (MS|E)in words: the credibility of MS given an expert's positive feedback. This conditional credibility can be calculated with Bayes's Theorem and the rule of total probability:
To determine the (`a posteriori') conditional credibility Cr (MS,E) we just need to know which values we have to put into the equation for Cr (E|MS) and Cr (E|¬MS). These conditional probabilities are interpreted as measures for the expert's reliability: Cr (E|MS) expresses the probability that the expert says MS is true! given the truth of MS, and Cr (E|¬MS) expresses the probability that the expert says MS is true! given the falsity of MS. The following relation holds between these two expressions:
(2) Cr (E|MS) = 1 Cr (E|¬MS). Regardless of the increase of the number of experts: no gain of a posteriori credibility is possible. This result is in line with our intuitions, because a reliability (Swinburne 2001, 6669) . Personally, I prefer to stick to Carnap's terminology and speak of credibilities (abbreviated to Cr).
of 0.5 is the reliability of a fair coin. We cannot get any additional information from it. To make the picture complete, let us nally have a look at the scenario with unreliable experts who assent more often to false than to true statements.
I assume Cr (E|MS) = 0.4. Obviously, the more the number of unreliable experts increases the more the a posteriori credibility is diminished. The rst lesson from this Bayesian model is that expert consensus is a truth indicator only if the following reliability condition is fullled: the experts have to be`minimally reliable', i.e. they have to speak the truth with a probability greater than 0.5.
Furthermore, a second condition is important. The iterative calculation of the expert judgments' contributions to the changes of the a posteriori credibility conducted in (3)(5) and (7)(9) is only applicable if the these judgments are statistically independent. The concept of statistical independence must not be confused with the concept of independent track records discussed above in section 3. In that case, the track record's independence of esoteric knowledge was decisive. But here, two expert judgments are statistically independent if the occurrence of E 1 's judgment makes it neither more nor less probable that E 2 judges in the same way. Usually that is the case when E 1 's causal process of belief formation is completely unaected by the belief forming process of E 2 . within an expert group balances out the credibility gain of a reliable expert.
If you calculate the a posteriori credibility for an expert group with three reliable and three unreliable experts, you will have an outcome of Cr (MS|E 16 ) = 0.5. The main reason to doubt the fullment of statistical independence was already mentioned in section 3 : the acquisition of moral knowledge is deeply entrenched in our social practices (parental education and education in school, public discussion and controversy about moral issues, extensive interaction and scholarly exchange within expert communities etc.). Against this background, it is implausible to assign statistical independence to the judgments of individual moral experts.
So, in the end, the Criteria (C) and (B) also fall short when applied to the domain of morality.
Conclusion
My main conclusion is that all the criteria that I have considered fail to serve as a reliable information resource for the identication of genuine moral expertise.
The basic problem is that these criteria are either inappropriate to identify the experts as experts concerning genuine questions of morality (Criteria (C) and (E)), that they presuppose exactly the moral knowledge we do not have available In the domain of morality, the ethics expert can only make justied contributions to explicate and clarify moral problems. When the moral assumptions are stated plainly and clearly, all the work the ethics expert is capable of is done.
Therefore, ethics expertise is only of indirect relevance for solving moral problems. Nevertheless, the competences of the ethics expert are often helpful in addressing complicated moral questions (especially in applied ethics).
Second, the distinction also allows us to explain and to justify why moral expertise is highly established in scientic and public discourse. It can simply be explained as an appeal not to genuine moral, but to ethics expertise. Whether someone possesses ethics expertise, however, is testable with reference to Goldman's criteria for expert identication, because the ethics expert's knowledge and abilities are identical with a proper subset of the knowledge and abilities of scientic, medical, mathematical and engineering experts. The appeal to ethics expertise is perfectly legitimate insofar as no insurmountable problem of expert identiability arises here.
Third, we can give a more precise account of the epistemic relevance of thè switching' eect laid out at the beginning of my paper. But as I have shown, in the domain of morality the esoteric/exoteric-distinction blurs and Goldman's criteria fail. We do not have any good reasons to ascribe moral expertise to anyone andthis is particularly important in the present contextwe consequently do not have good reasons to dispute that someone has moral expertise. We have no epistemic means to determine the general reliability of genuine moral experts. Consequently,`switching' is never epistemically justied in the moral domain, because justied`switching' presupposes knowledge concerning the general reliability of an expert and good epistemic reasons for the falsity of the expert's judgment. However, in genuine moral matters, our only epistemic option is to discuss our disagreements point by point, ques- 
